CHAPTER 17
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY
Article 110 — Democratic Control of Defense and Security
Defense, security, intelligence, policing, and all coercive powers of the state shall be exercised only under the Constitution, the law, and democratic civilian control.
No armed formation, intelligence structure, security body, police unit, paramilitary group, or state coercive institution may act outside the constitutional order.
The armed forces, reserve formations, intelligence services, police, and all security organs are servants of the Republic and of the people and shall remain politically neutral.
No defense or security body may serve the interests of a political party, faction, officeholder, private corporation, foreign actor, or unofficial center of power.
Orders manifestly contrary to the Constitution, fundamental rights, or criminal law are unlawful and shall not be obeyed. A member of the armed forces, intelligence services, police, or any security institution who refuses to carry out a manifestly unlawful order shall not be subject to criminal prosecution, disciplinary action, demotion, dismissal, or any other retaliation for that refusal. Retaliation against a person for refusing an unlawful order is itself a criminal offense.
Any act of a defense or security institution in violation of paragraphs 1 through 4 of this Article shall be investigated by the parliamentary intelligence and security oversight committee and referred to the Prosecutor General for criminal prosecution where evidence of criminal conduct exists. The Constitutional Court may order provisional measures to halt unconstitutional security operations upon application.
Article 110a — Absolute Prohibition on Use of Force Against the People of Qazaq Republic
The Armed Forces, intelligence services, security services, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, police, homeland security institutions, and all other state institutions holding coercive power are absolutely and unconditionally prohibited from being directed, ordered, deployed, or used against the civilian population of the Qazaq Republic, against persons exercising their constitutional rights, or against peaceful assemblies, demonstrations, or lawful civic activities.
Any order — regardless of its source, the rank of the person issuing it, or any claimed legal, emergency, or security basis — directing a member of the armed forces, intelligence services, security services, or police to use force, violence, armed coercion, detention without lawful judicial basis, or targeted surveillance against the people of Qazaq Republic is manifestly unlawful, constitutionally void, and has no legal force whatsoever.
Every member of the armed forces, intelligence services, security services, police, and every person serving in any state institution holding coercive power has an unconditional constitutional duty to refuse and disobey any order described in paragraph 2. This duty to disobey is absolute and overrides any claim of military hierarchy, chain of command, official rank, emergency declaration, or security classification.
Obedience to an order described in paragraph 2 is not a defense, justification, excuse, or mitigating circumstance in any criminal, administrative, disciplinary, or civil proceeding. A person who obeys such an order bears full personal criminal responsibility for the consequences of that obedience.
A person who gives, transmits, relays, endorses, or enforces an order described in paragraph 2 commits a grave crime against the Republic and against the people of Qazaq Republic, punishable by the most severe penalties established by law, including life imprisonment.
No state of emergency, martial order, classified instruction, executive decree, security directive, or claim of military necessity may authorize, justify, or provide legal cover for the use of the armed forces, intelligence services, security services, or police against the civilian population of the Qazaq Republic.
Article 111 — Constitutional Purposes of Defense and Security Institutions
The constitutional purposes of defense and security institutions are: a) protection of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic; b) protection of the democratic constitutional order; c) protection of the population from external aggression, terrorism, sabotage, espionage, violent insurrection, and grave threats defined by law; d) support to civil authorities in natural or technological catastrophe, only under the conditions established by Article 118(1)(d) of this Constitution, only where civilian capacity is insufficient, and only while civilian authorities remain in command.
Defense and security institutions shall not be used: a) to suppress peaceful political opposition; b) to influence elections, referendums, or public debate; c) to monitor, restrict, or interfere with the media, academic life, religious life, or civil associations, except where a specific court order issued against a specifically named person or entity authorizes a narrowly defined measure for a defined criminal investigative purpose; d) to collect information on citizens for political purposes.
Any use of defense or security institutions beyond the constitutional purposes stated in this Article is unconstitutional and constitutes a grave offense against the Republic. Senior officials who order, authorize, or knowingly permit such use shall be personally liable under criminal law. The Prosecutor General shall initiate proceedings upon receiving a credible report from the parliamentary oversight committee, the Ombudsman, or any court.
Article 112 — Civilian Supremacy
Civilian authority over all military and security institutions is inviolable.
No person in active military service, intelligence service, or police command may exercise supreme constitutional authority.
Strategic decisions on defense and security shall be made only by civilian constitutional institutions competent under this Constitution.
Democratic oversight of defense and security shall include: a) a permanent specialized parliamentary oversight committee with access to classified information sufficient for effective oversight, established under Article 120 of this Constitution; b) annual public reporting by the Government to Parliament on defense and security expenditure, operations, and institutional integrity, with classified annexes reviewed by the oversight committee; c) independent audit of defense and security budgets and procurement by the supreme public audit institution established under Article 163; d) constitutional law shall establish additional oversight mechanisms consistent with this Article, provided that no mechanism may be structured in a way that eliminates effective parliamentary and judicial accountability.